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Abstract
We study the ability of efficient quantum verifiers to decide properties of exponentially large
subsets given either a classical or quantum witness. We develop a general framework that can
be used to prove that QCMA machines, with only classical witnesses, cannot verify certain
properties of subsets given implicitly via an oracle. We use this framework to prove an oracle
separation between QCMA and QMA using an “in-place” permutation oracle, making the first
progress on this question since Aaronson and Kuperberg in 2007 [3]. We also use the framework
to prove a particularly simple standard oracle separation between QCMA and AM.
1 Introduction
How much computational power does an efficient quantum verifier gain when given a polynomial
sized quantum state to support the validity of a mathematical claim? In particular, is there a
problem that can be solved in this model, that cannot be solved if the verifier were instead given
a classical bitstring? This question, the so-called QMA vs. QCMA problem, is fundamental in
quantum complexity theory. To complexity theorists, the question can be motivated simply by
trying to understand the power of quantum nondeterminism, where both QMA and QCMA can
be seen as “quantum analogues” of NP. More physically, QMA is characterized by the k-local
Hamiltonian problem, in which we must decide if the ground state energy of a local Hamiltonian
is above or below a specified threshold [16, 5]. In this setting, the QMA vs. QCMA question
asks whether there exists a purely classical description of the ground state that allows us to make
this decision. For instance, if the ground state of any local Hamiltonian can be prepared by an
efficient quantum circuit, then QMA = QCMA, as the classical witness for the k-local Hamiltonian
problem would be the classical description of this quantum circuit. It was this intuition that caused
Aharonov and Naveh to conjecture that these classes are equal, in the paper that first defined QCMA
[5].
It was recently established [12] that the witness to a QMA machine may always be replaced
by a subset state, where a subset state on n qubits has the form |S〉 = 1/√|S|∑i∈S |i〉 for some
subset S ⊂ [2n]. However, it seems difficult to create a classical witness on n bits that captures the
information in a subset state |S〉. Therefore, problems involving subsets seem like ripe ground for
understanding the QMA vs. QCMA problem. We investigate the following question: under what
circumstances is it possible for a quantum machine to verify properties of a subset? This question
is not answered by [12]; they study general properties of languages that are in QMA and QCMA,
while we attempt to prove specific languages of interest (that are related to subsets) are either in
or not in QMA or QCMA.
In the hopes of further exploring these questions, we exhibit a general framework that can be
used to obtain oracle separations against QCMA for subset-based problems. We use this framework
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to prove the existence of an “in-place” permutation oracleP (a unitary that permutes standard basis
states within a single register) [10, 2] for which QMAP 6⊆ QCMAP , making the first progress on this
problem since Aaronson and Kuperberg in 2007 [3], who attained a “quantum oracle” separation
(i.e., a separation relative to an arbitrary black-box unitary transformation acting on a polynomial
number of qubits). In this problem, for the case of QMA, the in-place permutation oracle allows
us to verify that the given witness is indeed the correct subset state. On the other hand, our
framework allows us to prove the language is not in QCMA. Our framework is quite general, and
we are also able to use it to establish a particularly simple example of a (conventional) oracle O so
that AMO 6⊆ QCMAO .1
1.1 Subset-Verifying Oracle Problems
We consider two oracle problems related to verifying properties of subsets. In Subset Size Checking,
we are given a black box function f : [N2]→ {0, 1}, that marks elements with either a 0 or 1. We
are promised that the number of marked items is either N or 0.99N , and we would like to decide
which is the case. We want to verify the size of the subset marked by f.
In the other oracle problem, Preimage Checking, we are given a black box permutation on N2
elements. We are promised that the preimage of the first N elements under the permutation is
either mostly even or mostly odd, and we would like to decide which is the case. In this problem,
we want to verify this parity property of a subset of the preimage of the function.
Subset Size Checking is in AM [11], and we give a procedure that proves Preimage Checking is
in QMA when the permutation is given as an in-place quantum oracle. An in-place permutation
unitary Pσ acts as Pσ|i〉 = |σ(i)〉 for a permutation σ. For Preimage Checking, we are interested
in the set Spre(σ) = {i : σ(i) ∈ [N ]}. Given the subset state |Spre(σ)〉, it is easy to verify that the
correct state was sent, because Pσ|Spre(σ)〉 = |[N ]〉, which is easy to verify using a measurement in
the Hadamard basis.
However, we do not expect subset-based oracle languages like Subset Size Checking and Preimage
Checking to be in QCMA because the classical witness does not have enough information to identify
the relevant subset. We make this intuition more precise by providing a general recipe for proving
that subset-verifying oracle languages are not in QCMA. We apply this procedure to show that both
Preimage Checking (with a randomized in-place oracle - see Section 3 for more details) and Subset
Size Checking are not in QCMA. The procedure involves familiar tools, like the adversary bound
[6] (although adapted to our in-place oracle when necessary), as well as a new tool, the Fixing
Procedure, which finds subsets with nice structure within a large arbitrary set. We now sketch the
recipe:
1. We show that for every QCMA machine, there are more valid oracles than possible classical
witnesses, so by a counting argument, there must be one classical witness w∗ that corresponds
to a large number of potential oracles. We then restrict ourselves to considering oracles that
correspond to w∗.
2. Because we are considering subset-verifying problems, if we have a collection of black box
functions that corresponds to w∗, we immediately have some set of subsets that corresponds
to w∗. At this point, we know nothing about this set of subsets except its size, thanks to
the counting argument. We next show (using the Fixing Procedure) that if we have a set of
subsets of a certain size, we can always find a subset of the original set that has nice structure.
1Note there was previously an example of an oracle separating AM from PP [20]. Since QMA ⊆ PP [18], this is
formally a stronger result. Nonetheless, our oracle is substantially different, and uses completely different ideas.
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3. We apply the adversary bound to the subset with nice structure to show that the number of
quantum queries needed to distinguish between YES and NO cases is exponential.
4. We finally put these pieces together in a standard diagonalization argument.
1.2 Technical Contributions
Our adversary bound for in-place permutation oracles provides a query lower-bounding technique
for unitary oracles when access is not given to the inverse of the oracle. (While Belovs [9] created an
adversary bound for arbitrary unitaries, his results assume access to an inverse.) While we typically
assume quantum oracles include access to an inverse or are self-inverting, in open quantum systems
it is natural to not have an inverse.
When proving that Preimage Checking is not in QCMA, we use an oracle that is not unitary.
The oracle is a completely-positive trace-preserving (CPTP) map that at each application applies
one unitary chosen uniformly at random from among a set of unitaries. Standard lower bounding
techniques fail for such an oracle. The closest result is from Regev and Schiff [19] who give a lower
bound on solving Grover’s problem with an oracle that produces errors. Regev and Schiff deal
with the non-unitarity of the map by modeling the state of the system using pure states. This
strategy does not work in our case. Instead, we use the fact that every non-unitary CPTP map
can be implemented as a unitary on a larger system. In our case, we simulate our random oracle
using a unitary black box oracle acting on subsystem B, followed by a fixed unitary that entangles
subsystems A and B. The entangling operation can not be efficiently implemented, but as we are
bounding query complexity, this is acceptable. This technique may be of use for similar problems;
for example, we do not know the query complexity of solving Grover’s problem with an oracle that
produces a depolarizing error with each application. A depolarizing map is similar to our CPTP
map in that both maps can be thought of as applying a unitary at random from among a set of
unitaries, and so perhaps this approach will stimulate new approaches for the Grover problem.
1.3 Impact and Directions for Future Research
While Aaronson and Kuperberg have previously proved an oracle separation between QMA and
QCMA [3], their oracle seems to be especially quantum, as it is defined by a Haar random quantum
state. Our in-place oracle has more of a classical feel, in that it encodes a classical permutation
function. However, it is still not a standard quantum oracle, as it is not self-inverting. Is there
a standard (i.e. not in-place) oracle language that separates QMA and QCMA? Although we can
only prove a separation when our in-place oracle also has randomness, we believe our techniques
could be adapted to prove a similar result but without oracle randomness. While we give a recipe
for showing certain subset-based problems are not in QCMA, we believe some of these problems are
also not in QMA; for example, is it possible to prove Subset Size Checking is not in QMA?
Our contributions to techniques for lower bounding query complexity for non-standard oracles
raise several questions. Is there a general adversary bound [14, 17] for in-place permutation oracles?
There are examples of problems for which in-place permutation oracles require exponentially fewer
queries that standard permutation oracles e.g., [7]. We conjecture that there are also examples of
problems for which standard permutation oracles require exponentially fewer queries than in-place
oracles. In fact, we do not believe it is possible to obtain a Grover-type speed-up with an in-place
oracle; we believe the problem of determining the inverse of an element of an in-place permutation
oracle requires N queries for a permutation on N elements. However, in order to prove these results,
we suspect one needs a more powerful tool, like a general adversary bound for in-place oracles.
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1.4 Organization
The rest of the paper is organized as follows, in Section 2, we introduce notation that will be
used throughout the rest of the paper, and define QMA and QCMA. In Section 3, we define and
discuss standard, in-place, and randomized in-place quantum permutations, as well as state an
adversary lower bound for in-place permutation unitaries. In Section 4, we describe the Preimage
Checking Problem and prove it is in QMA. In Section 5, we lay out the general recipe for proving
subset-based languages are not in QCMA. In Section 6, we apply this procedure to the Subset Size
Checking problem, and use it to prove an oracle separation between AM and QCMA. Finally, in
Section 7, we apply the procedure to Preimage Checking and show this problem is not in QCMA.
2 Definitions and Notation
We use the notation [M ] = {1, 2, . . . ,M}. σ will refer to a permutation. Unless otherwise specified,
the sets we use, generally denoted S, will be a set of positive integers. Also, we will use bold
type-face to denote a set of sets. For instance, S will refer to a set of sets of positive integers. To
make our notation clearer, we will refer to such a set of sets as a set family. Likewise, we denote σ
to be a set of permutations acting on the same set of elements.
For S a set of positive integers, a subset state |S〉 is |S〉 = 1√
|S|
∑
i∈S |i〉.
Throughout, we use N = 2n. All logarithms are in base 2. We use σn to be the set of
permutations acting on N2 elements. That is, if σ ∈ σn, σ : [N2] → [N2]. For positive integers
i > j, let C(i, j) be the set family containing j elements of [i] : C(i, j) = {S ⊂ [i] : |S| = j}.
We use calligraphic font P, U to denote unitary operations. We use elaborated calligraphic font
P, U to denote CPTP maps. For a unitary CPTP map U acting on a density matrix ρ, we have
U (ρ) = UρU†, where (·)† denotes conjugate transpose. We will use O to denote a unitary oracle,
and O to denote a CPTP map oracle.
We include the following standard definition for completeness (e.g., see also [1, 3]).
Definition 1. QMA is the set of promise problems A = (AY es, ANo) so that there exists an efficient
quantum verifier VA and a polynomial p(·):
1. Completeness: For all x ∈ AY es there exists a p(|x|)-qubit pure quantum state |ψ〉 so that
Pr [VA(x, |ψ〉) = 1] ≥ 2/3
2. Soundness: For all x ∈ ANo and any pure quantum state |ψ〉, Pr [VA(x, |ψ〉) = 1] ≤ 1/3.
QCMA is the same class, with the witness |ψ〉 replaced by a polynomial length classical bitstring.
3 Permutation Maps
3.1 Permutations as Oracles: In-Place Permutation vs. Standard Permutation
Black box permutation unitaries have been considered previously, most notably in the collision and
element distinctness problems [2, 4]. However, the unitaries considered in these works were standard
oracles. A standard oracle implements the permutation σ ∈ σn as Pstandσ |i〉|b〉 = |i〉|b ⊕ σ(i)〉 for
i, b ∈ [N2], where |i〉 for i ∈ [N2] are standard basis states and ⊕ denotes bitwise XOR. Note that
(Pstandσ )2 = IN4 ; that is, acting with the unitary twice produces the N4 ×N4 identity operation.
We consider in-place permutation unitaries, which implement the permutation σ ∈ σn as Pσ|i〉 =
|σ(i)〉. In general (Pσ)2 6= IN2 . Crucially, given black box access to Pσ, we do not give black box
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access to its inverse. In fact, in Section 3.2, we show that given only Pσ, it is hard to invert its
action. Non-self-inverting permutation unitaries have been considered previously, in [10, 2].
We believe standard and in-place permutation unitaries are of incomparable computational
power. That is, given one type that implements σ, you can not efficiently simulate the other type
implementing the permutation σ. For example, if we have the state
∑
y∈S |y〉|σ(y)〉 (normalization
omitted), we can create the state
∑
y∈S |y〉|0〉 with a single query to Pstandσ . However, if we only
have access to the in-place permutation Pσ and not to P(σ)−1 = (Pσ)−1, it seems difficult to create
this state.
On the other hand, suppose we want to prepare the state
∑
y∈[N ] |σ(y)〉 (normalization omitted).
We can create this state in one query to the in-place permutation oracle Pσ by applying the oracle
to the uniform superposition
∑
y∈[N ] |y〉. In the standard model, this problem is called “index
erasure,” and requires an exponential number of queries in n to Pstandσ [7].
3.2 An Adversary Bound for In-Place Permutation Oracles
In Appendix A, we prove a non-weighted adversary bound for in-place permutations oracles that
is identical to what Ambainis proves in Theorem 6 in [6] for standard permutation oracles.
Lemma 2. Let σ ⊂ [V ] → [V ] be a subset of permutations acting on the elements [V ]. Let
f : σ → {0, 1} be a function of permutations. Let σX ⊂ σ be a set of permutations such that if
σ ∈ σX , then f(σ) = 1. Let σY ⊂ σ be a permutation family such that if σ ∈ σY then f(σ) = 0.
Let R ⊂ σX × σY be such that
• For every σx ∈ σX , there exists at least m different σy ∈ σY such that (σx, σy) ∈ R.
• For every σy ∈ σY , there exists at least m′ different σx ∈ σX such that (σx, σy) ∈ R.
• Let lx,i be the number of σy ∈ σY such that (σx, σy) ∈ R and σx(i) 6= σy(i). Let ly,i be the num-
ber of σx ∈ σY such that (σx, σy) ∈ R and σx(i) 6= σy(i). Then let lmax = max(σx,σy)∈R,i lx,ily,i.
Then given an in-place permutation oracle Pσ for σ ∈ σ that acts as Pσ|i〉 = |σ(i)〉, any quantum
algorithm that correctly evaluates f(σ) with probability 1− ǫ for every element of σX and σY must
use
(
1− 2√ǫ(1− ǫ))√mm′lmax queries to the oracle.
As a corollary of Lemma 2, (using exactly the same technique as Theorem 7 in [6]), we have
that the query complexity of inverting an in-place permutation oracle on V elements is Ω(V 1/2).
3.3 Permutations with Randomness
Additionally, we consider in-place permutation oracles with internal randomness that are CPTP
(completely-positive trace-preserving) maps, rather than unitaries. Oracles with internal random-
ness were shown to cause a complete loss of quantum speed-up in [19], while in [13], such oracles
were shown to give an infinite quantum speed-up.
We consider oracles that apply an in-place permutation at random from among a family of
possible permutations. Let σ ⊆ σn be a set of |σ| permutations. Then the CPTP map Pσ acts as
follows:
Pσ(ρ) =
1
|σ |
∑
σ∈σ
PσρP†σ. (1)
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4 Pre-Image Checking
In this section, we define a property of oracle families which we call randomized-preimage-correct,
and construct a decision language based on such oracles that is in QMA. Essentially, the problem
is to decide whether the preimage of the first N elements of a permutation is mostly even or odd.
Given a permutation σ ∈ σn, we associate a preimage subset Spre(σ) to that permutation (“pre”
is for “preimage”), where Spre(σ) = {j : σ(j) ∈ [N ]}. That is, Spre(σ) is the subset of elements
in [N2] whose image under σ is in [N ]. Additionally, to each subset S ⊆ [N2] with |S| = N , we
associate a set of permutations σpre(S), where σpre(S) = {σ : σ ∈ σn, Spre(σ) = S}. Let
Sneven = {S : S ⊂ [N2], |S| = N, |S ∩ Zeven| = 2/3N}
Snodd = {S : S ⊂ [N2], |S| = N, |S ∩ Zodd| = 2/3N}. (2)
Definition 3 (randomized-preimage-correct oracles). Let O be a countably infinite set of quantum
operators (CPTP maps): O = {O1,O2, . . . }, where each On implements an operation on (2n)-qubits.
We say that O is randomized-preimage-correct if for every n, On = Pσpre(S), with S ∈ Sneven ∪Snodd.
Theorem 4. For any randomized-preimage-correct O, the unary language LO , which contains those
unary strings 1n such that On = Pσpre(S) with S ∈ Sneven, is in QMAO .
Proof. We first prove completeness. We assume 1n ∈ LO , so On = Pσpre(S) for some S ∈ Sneven.
We consider using as a witness the subset state |S〉 on 2n qubits. We analyze the following verifier:
with probability 1/2, do either
Test (i) Apply Pσpre(S) to |S〉, and measure whether the resultant state is |[N ]〉. This measure-
ment can be done by applying H⊗n to the first n qubits, and then measuring all qubits
in the standard basis. If the outcome is 0, output 1; otherwise, output 0.
Test (ii) Measure |S〉 in the standard basis. Let i∗ be the resulting standard basis state. If i∗
is odd, output 0. Otherwise, apply Pσpre(S) to |i∗〉 and measure the resultant standard
basis state. If the resultant state is not in [N ], output 0; otherwise, output 1.
If Test (i) is implemented, the verifier always outputs 1 because all the permutations that might
be applied by Pσpre(S) transform |S〉 into |[N ]〉. If Test (ii) is implemented, the verifier outputs 1
with probability 2/3. Averaging over both Tests, the verifier outputs 1 with probability 5/6.
Now we show soundness. Let 1n /∈ LO , so On = Pσpre(S) for some S ∈ Snodd. Without loss
of generality, let the witness be the 2n-qubit state |ψ(S)〉 = ∑N2i=1 βi|i〉. If p(i) (resp. p(ii)) is the
probability the verifier outputs 1 after performing Test (i) (resp. Test (ii)), then we have
p(i) =
1
N
∣∣∣∣∣∑
i∈S
βi
∣∣∣∣∣
2
, p(ii) =
∑
i∈Zeven∩S
|βi|2. (3)
regardless of which permutation the map Pσpre(S) applies.
Using Cauchy-Schwarz and the triangle inequality, we have 1 ≥
(√
3p(i) + (
√
2− 1)p(ii)
)
/
√
2.
Thus the total probability that the verifier outputs 1 is
1
2
(
p(i) + p(ii)
)
≤ 1
2
2
3
(
1−
√
2− 1√
2
p(ii)
)2
+ p(ii)
 . (4)
The derivative of the right hand side is positive for 0 ≤ p(ii) ≤ 1, so to maximize the right hand side
we take p(ii) = 1. Doing this, we find the probability that the verifier outputs 1 is at most 2/3.
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We will show that the Preimage Checking problem is not in QCMA in Section 7.
Our proof that the Preimage Checking problem is in QMA works equally well for an in-place
oracle without randomness. We use the randomness in our oracle in the proof that randomized-
preimage-correct languages can not be decided by QCMA. We believe the separation holds even
without randomness in the oracle.
5 Strategy for Proving Subset-Based Oracle Languages are not in
QCMA
In this section, we describe a general strategy for showing that certain oracle languages are not in
QCMA. In particular, we consider the case when the oracles are related to sets of integers:
Definition 5 (Subset-Based Oracle). Let O = {O1,O2, . . . } be an oracle such that each On imple-
ments a p1(n)-qubit CPTP map from some set of maps On. Then we say O is a subset-based oracle
if there exists a set of bijective functions {g1, g2, . . . } with gn : On → Sn where Sn is the union of
disjoint subset families SnX and S
n
Y .
We also use the following definition:
Definition 6. Given a subset family S containing subsets of positive integers, and β ∈ R such that
β > 0, we say S is β-distributed if:
(1) There exists a (possibly empty) set Sfixed such that Sfixed ⊂ S for all S ∈ S.
(2) For every element i ∈ (⋃S∈S S) \ Sfixed, i appears in at most a 2−β-fraction of S ∈ S.
We call Sfixed the “fixed subset” of S.
We use the following Recipe for proving a subset-based oracle language is not in QCMA:
Recipe 1.
Set-up: Fix some enumeration over all poly(n)-size quantum verifiers M1,M2, ..., which we can do
because the number of such machines is countably infinite (by the Solovay-Kitaev theorem
[15]). Some of these verifiers may try to decide a language by trivially “hardwiring” its
outputs; for example, by returning 1 independent of the input. We start by fixing a unary
language L such that no machine Mi hardwires the language. We can always do this because
there are more languages than poly(n)-sized machines. Then our goal is to associate a subset-
based oracle O = {O1,O2, . . . } with L, such that 1n ∈ L if and only if gn(On) ∈ SnX , and to
show that even with access to O, no Mi can efficiently decide L for all n.
Consider the QCMA machine Mi, and suppose it is given access to a subset-based oracle O,
as well as a witness of pMi(n) bits for each input 1
n. Then for each On ∈ O there is some
subset of integers S ∈ Sn such that gn(On) = S. Since gn is bijective, S uniquely defines
On, so the optimal witness that causes Mi to accept On can be thought of as a function of S.
Let wi(S) be the witness that gives the highest probability of success in convincing Mi that
S ∈ SnX . Then we denote Si,wit(w) = {S : S ∈ SnX , w = wi(S)}.
Using the pigeonhole principle, there exists some string wi,n of pMi(n) bits such that
|Si,wit(wi,n)| ≥ 1
2pMi (n)
|SnX | . (5)
That is, there exists a witness such that a large number of subsets correspond to that witness.
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1. Prove that for n ≥ n∗i , there is a subset family SX ⊆ Si,wit(wi,n) that is α-distributed with
fixed subset Sfixed. Let SY = {S : S ∈ SnY , Sfixed ⊂ S}. Show the cardinality of SY is large.
2. Create a relation R ⊆ {O : O ∈ On, g(O) ∈ SX} × {O : O ∈ On, g(O) ∈ SY } and use R to
apply an adversary bound to prove a lower bound of Ω(Nα/2) = Ω(2nα/2) on the number of
queries Mi requires to distinguish some oracle Ox,n,i ∈ On such that gn(Ox,n,i) ∈ SnX from an
oracle Oy,n,i ∈ On such that gn(Oy,n,i) ∈ SnY .
3. Apply a standard Baker-Gill-Solovay diagonalization argument [8] to complete the proof.
That is, for each Mi, choose a unique ni ≥ n∗i , and if 1ni ∈ L, set Oni = Ox,ni,i and if 1ni /∈ L,
set Oni = Oy,ni,i. Then no QCMA machine can efficiently decide the language.
6 Subset Size Checking
In this section, we create a subset-based oracle language LO , such that LO ∈ AMO , but LO /∈
QCMAO . We use the strategy of Section 5 to prove LO /∈ QCMAO .
Let fS be a function that marks a subset S ⊂ [N2]. That is fS : {0, 1}2n → {0, 1}, such that
fS(i) = 1 if i ∈ S and 0 otherwise. Let FS be the unitary such that FS |i〉 = (−1)fS(i)|i〉.
Definition 7. Let O be a countably infinite set of unitaries (resp. boolean functions): O =
{O1,O2, ...}, where On implements a 2n-qubit (resp. bit) unitary (function). We say O is subset-
gapped if for every n, On = FS (resp. On = fS) for |S| = N or |S| = 0.99N .
Clearly O is a subset-based oracle (see Definition 5), with gn(On) = gn(FS) = S.
Then the following two lemmas give the desired oracle separation between AM and QCMA:
Lemma 8. For any subset-gapped O, the language LO that contains those strings 1n such that
On = fS with |S| = N , is in AMO .
Lemma 8 is proven by Goldwasser and Sipser in [11].
Lemma 9. For any subset-gapped O, the language LO that contains those strings 1n such that
On = FS with |S| = N , is not in QCMAO .
To prove this lemma, we follow Recipe 1. We address step 2 of the recipe in Lemma 10:
Lemma 10. Let 0 < α < 1/2 be a constant and p(·) be a polynomial function. Then there exists a
positive integer n∗(p, α), such that for every positive integer n > n∗(p, α), and every subset family
S ⊆ C(N2, N) such that |S| ≥ |C(N2, N)|2−p(n), there exists a subset family SX ⊆ S such that SX
is α-distributed with |Sfixed| < .5N .
(Since |Sfixed| < .5N , this implies |{S : S ∈ SnY , Sfixed ⊂ S}| is large, as desired.)
Proof Sketch: (Full proof in Appendix B.) We prove the existence of SX by construction. Let S be
any subset of C(N2, N) with |S| ≥ |C(N2, N)|2−p(n). We construct SX using the Fixing Procedure:
Fixing Procedure
1. Set SX = S, and set Sfixed = ∅.
2. (a) Let ν(i) be the number of subsets S ∈ SX such that i ∈ S.
(b) If there exists some element i for which |SX | > ν(i) ≥ |SX |N−α, set S′ ← {S :
S ∈ SX and i ∈ S}, set Sfixed ← Sfixed ∪ i, and return to step 2(a). Otherwise
exit the Fixing Procedure.
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By construction, the Fixing Procedure returns a set that is α-distributed (see Definition 6), so
we only need to ensure that not too many elements are fixed. We obtain a lower bound on the
final size of SX because each time an element is fixed, the size of the set decreases by at most N−α.
On the other hand, because SX is contained in C(N2, N), if a certain number of items are fixed,
we have an upper bound on the size of SX using the structure of C(N2, N) and a combinatorial
argument. We show that if more than .5N items are fixed, these upper and lower bounds contradict
each other, proving that less than .5N items must be fixed before the Fixing Procedure terminates.
We address Step 3 of Recipe 1 with the following Lemma:
Lemma 11. Suppose SX ⊂ C(N2, N) is the α-distributed subset created using the Fixing Procedure
of Lemma 10, with fixed subset Sfixed. Let SY = {S : S ∈ C(N2, 0.99N), Sfixed ⊂ S}. Then we can
construct an adversary bound to prove that for every quantum algorithm G, there exists Sx ∈ SX ,
and Sy ∈ SY , (that depend on G) such that, given oracle access to FSx or FSy , G can not distinguish
them with probability ǫ > .5 without using
(
1− 2√ǫ(1− ǫ))Nα/2 queries.
Proof Sketch: (Full proof in Appendix B.) We use Theorem 6 from [6]. This result is identical to
our Lemma 2, except with standard oracles rather than permutation oracles.
We let R = SX × SY . To apply Theorem 6, we need to show that for elements i such that
i ∈ Sx but i /∈ Sy for (Sx, Sy) ∈ R that either (1) Sx is not connected to many other sets Sy where
i /∈ Sy or (2) Sy is not connected to many other sets Sx where i ∈ Sx. We use the α-distributed
property of SX to show that property (2) holds. We show a similar result for the case i /∈ Sx but
i ∈ Sy for (Sx, Sy) ∈ R.
7 Oracle Separation of QMA and QCMA
In this section, we prove an oracle separation between QMA and QCMA. In particular, we show:
Theorem 12. There exists a randomized-preimage-correct oracle O, and a language LO which
contains those unary strings 1n where On = Pσpre(S) with S ∈ Sneven such that LO /∈ QCMAO .
Combined with Theorem 4, this gives the desired separation between QMA and QCMA.
Really, we would like to prove a different result, one that involves preimage-correct oracles:
Definition 13 (preimage-correct oracles). Let O be a countably infinite set of unitaries: O =
{O1,O2, . . . }, where each On implements an (2n)-qubit unitary. We say that O is preimage-correct
if for every n, On = Pσ, for some σ such that Spre(σ) ∈ Sneven ∪ Snodd.
The definition of preimage-correct oracles is very similar to that of randomized-preimage-correct
oracles in Definition 3, except there is no randomness in preimage-correct oracles – they are unitaries.
In fact, we believe:
Conjecture 14. There exists a preimage-correct oracle O, and a language LO which contains those
unary strings 1n where On = Pσ with Spre(σ) ∈ Sneven, such that LO /∈ QCMAO .
Theorem 4 applies equally well whether the oracle is preimage-correct or randomized-preimage-
correct. So why is it harder to prove Conjecture 14 than Theorem 12? The answer is that Recipe 1
is much easier to use if the optimal witness depends only on a subset of integers. Note randomized-
preimage-correct oracles have a one-to-one relationship with a subset of integers, and so the optimal
witness only depends on that subset. However for preimage-correct oracles, the optimal witness
might depend on some details of the permutation, which is more challenging to handle.
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For convenience, we define the complexity class QCMAexp,poly to be the analogue of QCMA, in
which the quantum verifier is allowed exponential time and space, but receives a polynomial length
classical witness. While trivially bounded-error quantum exponential time, BQEXP = QCMAexp,poly,
in general the query complexity of a QCMAexp,poly machine is not the same as the query complexity
of a BQEXP machine.
Our proof works as follows. We first show that if there is a QCMA machine that decides LO , for
all randomized-preimage-correct oracles O, then there will be a QCMAexp,poly machine that decides
L
O˜
for any preimage-correct oracle O˜, where, crucially, the optimal witness only depends on the
pre-image subset of the permutation implemented by the oracle. Then using Recipe 1, we show
that there is a language L
O˜
for a preimage-correct oracle O˜ such that no QCMAexp,poly machine
that can decide the language using an efficient number of queries to O˜ (with a witness that only
depends on the pre-image subset). This implies that there is no QCMA machine that solves the
randomized-preimage-correct oracle problem.
We first prove the reduction from deciding languages on pre-image correct oracles to languages
on randomized pre-image correct oracles.
Lemma 15. Given a randomized-preimage-correct oracle O, let 1n ∈ LO if On = Pσpre(S) with
S ∈ Sneven. Given a preimage-correct oracle O˜ let 1n ∈ LO˜ if On = Pσ with Spre(σ) ∈ Sneven. Then
if there is a QCMA machine M that decides LO for every randomized-preimage-correct O, then
there is a QCMAexp,poly machine M˜ that decides LO˜ for every preimage-correct O˜ such that M˜ uses
at most a polynomial number of queries to O˜, and on input 1n takes as input a classical witness w
that depends only on Spre(σ).
Proof Sketch: (Full proof in Appendix C.) Given a permutation σ, we can obtain all permutations
σ′ such that Spre(σ′) = Spre(σ) by first applying σ, and then permuting the first N elements and
the last N2−N elements separately. Consider a controlled-unitary that, if system A is in state |i〉,
implements the ith in-place permutation of the first N and last N2 −N elements on system B. If
we start with system A in an equal superposition, apply Pσ to B, apply the control to A and B,
and then trace out system A, the result is PSpre(σ) on system A. Thus, given any preimage-correct
oracle Pσ, we can simulate the randomized-preimage-correct oracle PSpre(σ).
Using this simulation trick, we can create an algorithm M˜ using a preimage-correct oracle that
has the same outcomes as any algorithm M using a randomized-preimage-correct oracle, which
uses the oracle the same number of times, and has a witness that only depends on the preimage
subset. However, we do not believe the control permutation can be implemented efficiently, and
that is why we must consider the class QCMAexp,poly.
Lemma 16. There exists a preimage-correct O such that there is no QCMAexp,polyO machine M
that decides LO using a polynomial number of queries, where the classical witness on input 1n
depends only on Spre(σ), when On = Pσ.
Note that Lemma 16, combined with the contrapositive of Lemma 15, proves Theorem 12.
To prove Lemma 16, we use Recipe 1. Even though we do not have a true subset-based oracle
(the function g(Pσ) = Spre(σ) is not injective), using the constraint that the classical witness
depends only on Spre(σ), we can apply the recipe.
Additionally, while Recipe 1 refers to the class QCMA, because we are only making a statement
about query complexity (and say nothing about space or time complexity), the approach also
applies to the query complexity of QCMAexp,poly.
We prove steps 2 and 3 of Recipe 1 in Lemmas 17 and 18. These proofs are quite similar to the
proofs of Lemmas 10 and 11; the full proofs can be found in Appendix D.
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Lemma 17. Let 0 < α < 1/2 be a constant and p(·) be a polynomial function. Then there exists
a positive integer n∗(p, α), such that for every n > n∗(p, α), and every subset family S ⊂ Sneven
such that |S| ≥ |Sneven|2−p(n), there exists a subset family SX ⊂ S such that SX is α-distributed.
Furthermore the fixed subset Sfixed of SX contains at most N/3 even elements.
Lemma 18. Let SX be the α-distributed set created using the Fixing Procedure from Lemma 17,
with fixed subset Sfixed. Let SY = {S : S ∈ Snodd, Sfixed ⊂ S}. Then we can construct an adversary
bound to prove that for every quantum algorithm G, there exists permutations σx, σy ∈ σn with
Spre(σx) ∈ SX and Spre(σy) ∈ SY , (that depend on G) such that, given oracle access to Pσx or Pσy ,
G can not distinguish them with probability ǫ > .5 without using
(
1− 2√ǫ(1− ǫ))Nα/2 queries.
The proof strategy of Lemma 17 (like Lemma 10) involves a Fixing Procedure. However, the
details are slightly more complex because we must deal with fixing even and odd elements.
The proof strategy of Lemma 18 is similar to Lemma 11, except we use a more complex relation
R for the adversary bound. The challenge is that for two similar subsets Sx and Sy, there exist
permutations σx and σy that are extremely dissimilar but for which Spre(σx) = Sx and Spre(σy) =
Sy. We want to create a relationship R that connects similar permutations, while only having
information about the structure of the related subsets. To address this problem, we note that for
any two subsets Sx and Sy, we can create a one-to-one matching between the elements of σpre(Sx)
and the elements of σpre(Sy) such that each permutation is matched with a similar permutation.
Using this one-to-one matching, we create a relationship R between permutations that inherits the
properties of the related subsets.
As an immediate corollary of Theorem 4 and Theorem 12, there exists a randomized-preimage-
correct oracleO and language LO such that L /∈ QCMAO but L ∈ QMAO , and so QMAO 6⊆ QCMAO .
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A An Adversary Bound for Permutation Oracles
We will prove Lemma 2:
Lemma 2. Let σ ⊂ [V ] → [V ] be a subset of permutations acting on the elements [V ]. Let
f : σ → {0, 1} be a function of permutations. Let σX ⊂ σ be a set of permutations such that if
σ ∈ σX , then f(σ) = 1. Let σY ⊂ σ be a permutation family such that if σ ∈ σY then f(σ) = 0.
Let R ⊂ σX × σY be such that
• For every σx ∈ σX , there exists at least m different σy ∈ σY such that (σx, σy) ∈ R.
• For every σy ∈ σY , there exists at least m′ different σx ∈ σX such that (σx, σy) ∈ R.
• Let lx,i be the number of σy ∈ σY such that (σx, σy) ∈ R and σx(i) 6= σy(i). Let ly,i be the num-
ber of σx ∈ σY such that (σx, σy) ∈ R and σx(i) 6= σy(i). Then let lmax = max(σx,σy)∈R,i lx,ily,i.
Then given an in-place permutation oracle Pσ for σ ∈ σ that acts as Pσ|i〉 = |σ(i)〉, any quantum
algorithm that correctly evaluates f(σ) with probability 1− ǫ for every element of σX and σY must
use
(
1− 2√ǫ(1− ǫ))√mm′lmax queries to the oracle.
We note that this is identical to Ambainis’ adversary bound for permutations (see Theorem 6
in [6]).
Proof. We assume that we have a control permutation oracle, that acts as
P|x〉C |i〉A|z〉Q = |x〉|σx(i)〉|z〉 (6)
where the Hilbert space HC has dimension |σ |,the Hilbert space HA has dimension V and is where
the permutation is carried out, and HQ is a set of ancilla qubits.
Let |ψt〉 be the state of the system immediately after t uses of the control oracle. Let |ϕt〉 be
the state of the system immediately before the tth use of the control oracle. Let ρt be the reduced
state of the system immediately after t uses of the control oracle, where systems A and Q have been
traced out. That is, ρt = trAQ(|ψt〉〈ψt|). Let
(
ρt
)
xy be the (x, y)
th
element of the density matrix.
Then we will track the progress of the following measure:
W t =
∑
(σx,σy)∈R
∣∣∣(ρt)xy∣∣∣ . (7)
Notice that unitaries that only act on the subsystems Q and A do not affect W t.
If the state before the first use of the oracle is
|ψ0〉 =
 1√
2|σX |
∑
σx∈σX
|x〉+ 1√
2|σY |
∑
σy∈σY
|y〉
⊗ |φ〉AQ, (8)
then following Ambainis (e.g. Theorem 2 [6]), we have that for an algorithm to succeed with
probability at least 1− ǫ after T uses of the oracle, we must have
W 0 −W T >
(
1− 2
√
ǫ(1− ǫ)
)√
mm′ (9)
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Now we calculate how much W t can change between uses of the oracle. Suppose without loss
of generality that
|ϕt〉 = 1√
2|σX |
∑
σx∈σX
∑
i,z
αx,i,z|x, i, z〉CAQ + 1√
2|σY |
∑
σy∈σY
∑
i,z
αy,i,z|y, i, z〉CAQ. (10)
Then we have
|ψt〉 = 1√
2|σX |
∑
σx∈σX
∑
i,z
αx,i,z|x, σx(i), z〉CAQ + 1√
2|σY |
∑
σy∈σY
∑
i,z
αy,i,z|y, σy(i), z〉CAQ
=
1√
2|σX |
∑
σx∈σX
∑
i,z
αx,σ−1x (i),z|x, i, z〉CAQ +
1√
2|σY |
∑
σy∈σY
∑
i,z
αy,σ−1y (i),z|y, i, z〉CAQ. (11)
Hence for (σx, σy) ∈ R, we have
(ρt)xy =
1
2
√|σX ||σY |
∑
i,z
αx,σ−1x (i),zα
∗
y,σ−1y (i),z
(ρt−1)xy =
1
2
√|σX ||σY |
∑
i,z
αx,i,zα
∗
y,i,z, (12)
where (·)∗ signifies the complex conjugate. Now we can calculate W t −W t−1 :
W t−1 −W t =
∑
(σx,σy)∈R
|(ρt−1)xy| − |(ρt)xy|
≤
∑
(σx,σy)∈R
|(ρt−1)xy − (ρt)xy|. (13)
From Eq. (12), we see that whenever σ−1x (i) = σ
−1
y (i), we have a cancellation between the
corresponding elements of (ρt)xy and (ρt−1)xy. However, when σ−1x (i) 6= σ−1y (i), terms do not
cancel. To see this more explicitly, we rewrite Eq. (13) as
W t−1 −W t ≤ 1
2
√|σX ||σY |
∑
(σx,σy)∈R
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
z
 ∑
i:σx(i)=σy(i)
αx,i,zα
∗
y,i,z +
∑
i:σx(i)6=σy(i)
αx,i,zα
∗
y,i,z
−
∑
i:σ−1x (i)=σ
−1
y (i)
αx,σ−1x (i),zα
∗
y,σ−1y (i),z
−
∑
i:σ−1x (i)6=σ
−1
y (i)
αx,σ−1x (i),zα
∗
y,σ−1y (i),z

∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ . (14)
Consider the sets Tx,y = {i : σx(i) = σy(i)} and Ux,y = {σ−1x (i) : σ−1x (i) = σ−1y (i)}. We will
show Ux,y = Tx,y. Suppose i ∈ Tx,y. Then σx(i) = σy(i) = i′, for some i′. But that implies
σ−1x (i
′) = σ−1y (i
′) = i, so σ−1x (i
′) = i ∈ Ux,y, and thus Tx,y ⊂ Ux,y. The opposite direction is shown
similarly. Therefore, those two sums in Eq. (14) cancel, and, moving the summation over z and i
outside the absolute values by the triangle inequality, we are left with
W t−1 −W t ≤ 1
2
√|σX ||σY |
∑
z,(σx,σy)∈R
 ∑
i:σx(i)6=σy(i)
∣∣∣αx,i,zα∗y,i,z∣∣∣+ ∑
i:σ−1x (i)6=σ
−1
y (i)
∣∣∣αx,σ−1x (i),zα∗y,σ−1y (i),z∣∣∣
 .
(15)
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Now we use the AM-GM to bound the terms in the absolute values:
W t−1 −W t ≤1
2
∑
z,(σx,σy)∈R
 ∑
i:σx(i)6=σy(i)
(√
ly,i
lx,i
|αx,i,z|2
2|σX | +
√
lx,i
ly,i
|α∗y,i,z|2
2|σY |
)
+
1
2
∑
z,(σx,σy)∈R
 ∑
i:σ−1x (i)6=σ
−1
y (i)

√
ly,i
lx,i
∣∣∣αx,σ−1x (i),z∣∣∣2
2|σX | +
√
lx,i
ly,i
∣∣∣∣α∗y,σ−1y (i),z
∣∣∣∣2
2|σY |

 (16)
We now show that for (σx, σy) ∈ R,∑
i:σ−1x (i)6=σ
−1
y (i)
|αx,σ−1x (i),z|
2 =
∑
i:σx(i)6=σy(i)
|αx,i,z|2,
∑
i:σ−1x (i)6=σ
−1
y (i)
|αy,σ−1y (i),z|
2 =
∑
i:σx(i)6=σy(i)
|αy,i,z|2. (17)
We prove the first equality, and the second is proven similarly. We define
T ′x,y = [V ] \ Tx,y,
U ′x,y = [V ] \ Ux,y. (18)
Looking at the definition of Tx,y and Ux,y, we see that
T ′x,y = {i : σx(i) 6= σy(i)}
U ′x,y = {σ−1x (i) : σ−1x (i) 6= σ−1y (i)}. (19)
We previously showed Tx,y = Ux,y, so we have T ′x,y = U
′
x,y. Therefore∑
i:σ−1x (i)6=σ
−1
y (i)
|αx,σ−1x (i),z|
2 =
∑
i:U ′x,y
|αx,j,z|2 =
∑
i:T ′x,y
|αx,i,z|2
∑
i:σx(i)6=σy(i)
|αx,i,z|2. (20)
Thus, Eq. (16) becomes
W t−1 −W t ≤
∑
z,(σx,σy)∈R
 ∑
i:σx(i)6=σy(i)
(√
ly,i
lx,i
|αx,i,z|2
2|σX | +
√
lx,i
ly,i
|α∗y,i,z|2
2|σY |
) . (21)
Now we switch the order of summation and then use the definition of lx,i and ly,i to get
W t−1 −W t ≤
∑
i∈[V ],z
 ∑
(σx,σy)∈R:σx(i)6=σy(i)
(√
ly,i
lx,i
|αx,i,z|2
2|σX | +
√
lx,i
ly,i
|α∗y,i,z|2
2|σY |
)
≤
∑
i∈[V ],z
 ∑
σx∈σX
√
lx,i max
σy:(σx,σy)∈R
ly,i
|αx,i,z|2
2|σX | +
∑
σy∈σY
√
ly,i max
σx:(σx,σy)∈R
lx,i
|α∗y,i,z|2
2|σY |

(22)
Finally, using the definition of lmax we have
W t−1 −W t ≤
√
lmax
∑
i∈[V ],z
 ∑
x∈σX
|αx,i,z|2
2|σX | +
∑
σy∈σY
|α∗y,i,z|2
2|σY |

≤
√
lmax, (23)
where we have used that Eq. (10) is a normalized state.
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B Proofs of Lemmas 10 and 11
Lemma 10. Let 0 < α < 1/2 be a constant and p(·) be a polynomial function. Then there exists a
positive integer n∗(p, α), such that for every positive integer n > n∗(p, α), and every subset family
S ⊆ C(N2, N) such that |S| ≥ |C(N2, N)|2−p(n), there exists a subset family SX ⊆ S such that SX
is α-distributed with |Sfixed| < .5N .
Proof. We prove the existence of S′ by construction. Let S be any subset family of C(N2, N) such
that |S| ≥ |C(N2, N)|2−p(n). We construct S′ using the following procedure:
Fixing Procedure
1. Set S′ = S, and set Sfixed = ∅.
2. (a) Let ν(i) be the number of subsets S ∈ SX such that i ∈ S.
(b) If there exists some element i for which
|SX | > ν(i) ≥ |SX |N−α (24)
set S′ ← {S : S ∈ SX and i ∈ S}, set Sfixed ← Sfixed ∪ i, and return to step
2(a). Otherwise exit the Fixing Procedure.
The Fixing Procedure by construction will always return a set that satisfies Definition 6. Now
we just need to bound the size of Sfixed.
Let’s suppose that at some point in the Fixing Procedure, for sets S′ and Sfixed, we have .5N
items fixed. Suppose for contradiction there is some element i∗ /∈ Sfixed that appears in greater
than N−α fraction of S ∈ S′.
Let us look at the set family S′′ = {S : S ∈ S′, i∗ ∈ S}. Because (Sfixed ∪ i∗) ⊂ S for all S ∈ S′′,
there are .5N−1 elements in each S ∈ S′′ that can be chosen freely from the remaining N2− .5N−1
un-fixed elements. Thus, we have
|S′′| ≤
(
N2 − .5N − 1
.5N − 1
)
. (25)
By assumption |S′′| ≥ |S′|N−α, so
|S′| ≤
(
N2 − .5N − 1
.5N − 1
)
Nα
≤
(
N2
.5N
)
Nα
≤ (2Ne)N/2Nα
= 2N/2(log(2e)+logN)+log(N)α
= 2O(N)+(N/2) logN . (26)
However, we can also bound the size of S′ from the Fixing Procedure. Notice that at every step
of the Fixing Procedure, the size of S′ is reduced by at most a factor N−α. Since we are assuming
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.5N elements are in Sfixed, the Fixing Procedure can reduce the original set S by at most a factor
N−αN/2. Since |S| ≥ |C(N2, N)|2−p(n), we have that at this point in the Fixing Procedure
|S′| ≥ |C(N2, N)|2−p(n)N−αN/2
=
(
N2
N
)
2−p(n)N−αN/2
≥ NN2−p(n)N−αN/2
= 2N logN−p(n)−log(N)αN/2
= 2−O(N)+N logN(1−α/2). (27)
Notice that as long as α < 1, for large enough N (in particular, for N > 2n
∗
for some positive
integer n∗, where n∗ depends on α and p(·)), the bound of Eq. (27) will be larger than the bound
of Eq. (26), giving a contradiction. Therefore, our assumption must have been false, and more
than N/2 elements can not have been fixed during the Fixing Procedure. Therefore, the final set
produced by the Fixing Procedure will satisfy point (2) of Definition 6.
Lemma 11. Suppose SX ⊂ C(N2, N) is the α-distributed subset created using the Fixing Procedure
of Lemma 10, with fixed subset Sfixed. Let SY = {S : S ∈ C(N2, 0.99N), Sfixed ⊂ S}. Then we can
construct an adversary bound to prove that for every quantum algorithm G, there exists Sx ∈ SX ,
and Sy ∈ SY , (that depend on G) such that, given oracle access to FSx or FSy , G can not distinguish
them with probability ǫ > .5 without using
(
1− 2√ǫ(1− ǫ))Nα/2 queries.
Proof. Note SY is non-empty, since only .5N elements are in Sfixed.
We will use Theorem 6 from [6]. This result is identical to our Lemma 2, except with standard
oracles rather than permutation oracles. We define the relation R as:
R = {(Sx, Sy) : Sx ∈ SX , Sy ∈ SY }. (28)
Notice that each Sx ∈ SX is paired with every element of SY . Thus m = |SY |. Likewise m′ = |SX |.
Now consider (Sx, Sy) ∈ R. We first consider the case of some element j such that j ∈ Sx but
j /∈ Sy. By our construction of SY , j /∈ Sfixed. We upper bound lx,j, the number of Sy′ such that
(Sx, Sy′) ∈ R and j /∈ Sy′ . We use the trivial upper bound lx,j ≤ |SY |, which is sufficient for our
purposes. Next we need to upper bound ly,j , the number of Sx′ such that (Sx′ , Sy) ∈ R and j ∈ Sx.
Since Sy is paired with every element of SX in R, we just need to determine the number of sets
in SX that contain j. Because SX is α-distributed, there can be at most N−α|SX | elements of SX
that contain j. In this case we have
lx,jly,j ≤ |SX ||SY |N−α. (29)
We now consider the case that j ∈ Sy but j /∈ Sx. (Note this case only occurs when Sfixed
contains less than 0.99N elements.) We upper bound ly,j, the number of Sx′ such that (Sx′ , Sy) ∈ R
and j /∈ Sx′ . Again, we use the trivial upper bound of ly,j ≤ |SX |, which is sufficient for our analysis.
Next we upper bound lx,j, the number of Sy′ such that (Sx, Sy′) ∈ R and j ∈ Sy′ . In our choice of
R, Sx is paired with every Sy ∈ SY , so we need to count the number of S ∈ SY that contain j. We
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have
lx,j =
(
N2 − Sfixed − 1
0.99N − Sfixed − 1
)
=
0.99N − Sfixed
N2 − Sfixed |SY |
≤ 1
N
|SY |. (30)
Therefore in this case, we have
lx,jly,j ≤ |SX ||SY |N−1. (31)
Looking at Eq. (29) and Eq. (31), we see that because α < 1, the bound of Eq. (29) dominates,
and so we have that √
mm′
lx,jly,j
≥
√
|SX ||SY |
|SX ||SY |N−α = N
α/2. (32)
Using the contrapositive of Lemma 2, if an algorithm G makes less than q queries to an oracle
FS where S is promised to be in SX or SY , there exists at least one element of SX and one element
of SY such that the probability of distinguishing between the corresponding oracles less than is
1/2 + ǫ, where
1
2
√
2N−α/2q > ǫ. (33)
Equivalently, there exists at least one element of SX and one element of SY such that in order for
A to distinguish them with constant bias, one requires Ω(Nα/2) queries.
C Proof of Lemma 15
Lemma 15. Given a randomized-preimage-correct oracle O, let 1n ∈ LO if On = Pσpre(S) with
S ∈ Sneven. Given a preimage-correct oracle O˜ let 1n ∈ LO˜ if On = Pσ with Spre(σ) ∈ Sneven. Then
if there is a QCMA machine M that decides LO for every randomized-preimage-correct O, then
there is a QCMAexp,poly machine M˜ that decides LO˜ for every preimage-correct O˜ such that M˜ uses
at most a polynomial number of queries to O˜, and on input 1n takes as input a classical witness w
that depends only on Spre(σ).
Proof. We denote the composition of two CPTP maps with ◦, so E ◦F means apply F first, and
then E .
For each input 1n, M applies an algorithm that takes as input a standard basis state. Because
S completely characterizes Pσpre(S), the optimal witness will depend only on S.
Suppose on input 1n to M , the algorithm is the following:
LAB ◦ (O)A ◦ (Ut)AB ◦ · · · ◦ (U2)AB ◦ (O)A ◦ (U1)AB(|w〉〈w| ⊗ |ψ0〉〈ψ0|)AB (34)
where |w〉〈w| is the witness state (that depends only on S) in the standard basis and Ui are fixed
unitaries and L . The two subspaces A and B refer to the subset where the oracle acts (A) and
the rest of the workspace (B). The two subspaces do not refer to the tensor product structure of
the initial state.
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For i ∈ [N !(N2 − N)!] let τ n = {τi} be the set of permutations on the elements of [N2] that
do not mix the first N elements with the last N2 − N elements. Then let PCn be the following
control-permutation:
PCn |i〉|j〉 =
{
|i〉|τi(j)〉 for i ∈ [N !(N2 −N)!]
|i〉|j〉 otherwise. (35)
PCn is the respective CPTP map.
PCn is a completely known unitary that is independent of the oracle, however, we do not know
how to implement this unitary in polynomial time. This unitary is the reason we consider the class
QCMAexp,poly in this proof rather than the more standard QCMA. Ultimately, we care about query
complexity - not the complexity of the unitaries that occur between the oracle applications.
Let
|χn〉 = 1√
N !(N2 −N)!
N !(N2−N)!∑
i=1
|i〉 (36)
Then on input 1n we have M˜ implement the algorithm
LAB ◦ (PCn )CtA ◦ (O)A ◦ (Ut)AB ◦ · · ·
◦ (U2)AB ◦ (PCn )C1A ◦ (O)A ◦ (U1)AB
(
|χn〉〈χn|tC ⊗ (|w〉〈w| ⊗ |ψ0〉〈ψ0|)AB
)
(37)
where (PCτ )CiA means the Ci
th register controls the Ath register, and initially, the Cith register is
the ith copy of |χn〉, and O is the CPTP version of the oracle O.
Let ρi(O) (resp. ρ˜i(O)) be the state of the system during the algorithm M (resp. M˜) after
the ith use of the oracle. Let ρ0(O) (resp. ρ˜0(O)) be the initial state of the respective algorithms.
Then we will show that
ρi(Pσpre(Spre(σ))) = trC1,...,Ct (ρ˜i(Pσ)) . (38)
As a consequence of this, the probability distribution of measurement outcome of the two algorithms
will be identical.
We prove this by induction. For the initial step, we have
ρ0(Pσpre(Spre(σ))) = |w〉〈w| ⊗ |ψ0〉〈ψ0| (39)
while
trC(ρ˜0(Pσ)) = trC
(
|χn〉〈χn|tC ⊗ (|w〉〈w| ⊗ |ψ0〉〈ψ0|)AB
)
=|w〉〈w| ⊗ |ψ0〉〈ψ0|. (40)
For the induction step, we need to show
ρk(Pσpre(Spre(σ))) = trC1,...,Ct (ρ˜k(Pσ)) . (41)
Because Pσpre(Spre(σ)) has an equal probability of applying Pσ for each σ such that S(σ) = S, we
have
ρk(Pσpre(Spre(σ))) =Pσpre(Spre(σ))
(
Ukρk−1(Pσpre(Spre(σ)))U†k
)
=
1
N !(N2 −N)!
N !(N2−N)!∑
i=1
PτiPσUkρk−1(Pσpre(Spre(σ)))U†kP†σP†τi . (42)
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On the other hand
trC (ρ˜k(Pσ)) = trC
(
(PCτ )CkAPσUk(ρ˜k−1(Pσ))U†kP†σ(PCτ )†CkA
)
=
1
N !(N2 −N)!
N !(N2−N)!∑
i=1
PτiPσUk trC (ρ˜k−1(Pσ))U†kP†σP†τi (43)
Now we need to show M˜ decides LO for a preimage-correct oracle O. Let’s consider an input
1n. Suppose On = Pσ, where Spre(σ) ∈ Sneven. Then because M decides LO for any randomized-
preimage-correct, there exists a witness w that depends only on Spre(σ) such that when the oracle
is Pσpre(Spre(σ)) the output of M is 1 with probability at least 2/3. Using the same witness w, M˜
will therefore produce output 1 with probability at least 2/3.
Now consider an input 1n such that On = Pσ where Spre(σ) ∈ Snodd. Because M decides LO
for a randomized-preimage-correct oracle O, when M is run with the oracle Pσpre(Spre(σ)), for any
witness w, M will output 1 with probability at most 1/3. But because M˜ will have the same
probability distribution of outcomes, this means that for any witness w to M˜ , with oracle Pσ, M˜
will output 1 with probability at most 1/3.
D Proofs of Lemmas 17 and 18
Lemma 17. Let 0 < α < 1/2 be a constant and p(·) be a polynomial function. Then there exists
a positive integer n∗(p, α), such that for every n > n∗(p, α), and every subset family S ⊂ Sneven
such that |S| ≥ |Sneven|2−p(n), there exists a subset family SX ⊂ S such that SX is α-distributed.
Furthermore the fixed subset Sfixed of SX contains at most N/3 even elements.
Proof. We prove the existence of S′ by construction. Let S be any subset of Sneven such that
|S| ≥ |Sneven|2−p(n). We construct SX using the following procedure, which we call the fixing
procedure.
Fixing Procedure
1. Set SX = S, and set Sfixed = ∅.
2. (a) Let ν(i) be the number of subsets S ∈ SX such that i ∈ S.
(b) If there exists some element i for which
|SX | > ν(i) ≥ |SX |N−α (44)
set SX ← {S : S ∈ SX and i ∈ S}, set Sfixed ← Sfixed ∪ i, and return to step
2(a). Otherwise exit the Fixing Procedure.
By construction, SX will satisfy Definition 6. Now we need to check that the Fixing Procedure
stops before fixing more than N/3 even items.
Let’s suppose that at some point in the Fixing Procedure, for sets SX and Sfixed, we have N/3
even items fixed. Suppose for contradiction, that at this point, there is some even element i∗ such
that i∗ appears in greater than N−α fraction of S ∈ SX . Let’s also assume without loss of generality
that |Sfixed ∩ Zodd| = kodd ≤ N/3.
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Let us look at the set
S′′ = {S : S ∈ SX , i∗ ∈ S}. (45)
Because (Sfixed ∪ i∗) ⊂ S for all S ∈ S′′, there are N/3− 1 even elements that can be freely chosen
for S ∈ S′′ and N/3− kodd odd elements that can be freely chosen. Thus, we have
|S′′| ≤
(
N2/2−N/3− 1
N/3− 1
)(
N2/2 − kodd
N/3− kodd
)
. (46)
By assumption
|S′′| ≥ |SX |N−α, (47)
so
|SX | ≤
(
N2/2−N/3− 1
N/3 − 1
)(
N2/2− kodd
N/3 − kodd
)
Nα
≤
(
N2/2
N/3
)(
N2/2
N/3
)
Nα
≤ (3Ne/2)2N/3Nα
= 22N/3(log(3e/2)+logN)+log(N)α
= 2O(N)+(2N/3) logN . (48)
However, we can also bound the size of SX from the Fixing Procedure. Notice that at every step
of the Fixing Procedure, the size of SX is reduced by at most a factor N−α. Since we are assuming
N/3 even elements are in Sfixed and kodd ≤ N/3 odd elements are in Sfixed, the Fixing Procedure
can reduce the original set family S by at most a factor N−α(2N/3). Since |S| ≥ |Sneven|2−p(n), we
have that at this point in the Fixing Procedure
|SX | ≥ |Sneven|2−p(n)N−α(2N/3)
=
(
N2/2
2N/3
)(
N2/2
N/3
)
2−p(n)N−α(2N/3)
≤ (3N/4)2N/3(3N/4)N/32−p(n)N−α(2N/3)
= 22N/3(log(3/4)+logN)+N/3(log(3/4)+logN)−p(n)−log(N)α2N/3
= 2N logN(1−2α/3)+N log(3/4)−p(log(N))
= 2−O(N)+N logN(1−2α/3). (49)
Notice that as long as α < 1/2, for large enough N (in particular, for N > 2n
∗
for some positive
integer n∗, where n∗ depends on α and p(·)), the bound of Eq. (49) will be larger than the bound
of Eq. (48), giving a contradiction. Therefore, our assumption, must have been false, and at this
point in the Fixing Procedure, all even elements i ∈ [N2]/Sfixed will appear in at most a fraction
N−α of S ∈ SX . Thus at the next step of the Fixing Procedure, an even element will not be added
to Sfixed, and the number of even elements in Sfixed will stay bounded by N/3. The same logic can
be reapplied at future steps of the Fixing Procedure, even if additional odd items are added.
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Lemma 18. Let SX be the α-distributed set created using the Fixing Procedure from Lemma 17,
with fixed subset Sfixed. Let SY = {S : S ∈ Snodd, Sfixed ⊂ S}. Then we can construct an adversary
bound to prove that for every quantum algorithm G, there exists permutations σx, σy ∈ σn with
Spre(σx) ∈ SX and Spre(σy) ∈ SY , (that depend on G) such that, given oracle access to Pσx or Pσy ,
G can not distinguish them with probability ǫ > .5 without using
(
1− 2√ǫ(1− ǫ))Nα/2 queries.
Proof. Since SX is α-distributed, there exists a set Sfixed of elements such that Sfixed ⊂ S for
all S ∈ SX , where Sfixed contains at most N/3 odd elements and at most N/3 even elements.
(Otherwise Condition (2) of Definition 6 will not be satisfied.) We choose
σY = {σ : Spre(σ) ∈ SY },
σX = {σ : Spre(σ) ∈ SX}. (50)
We now define the relationR needed to apply our adversary bound. For each (Sx, Sy) ∈ SX×SY ,
we will create a one-to-one matching in R between the elements of σpre(Sx) and σpre(Sy). We first
choose any element σ∗x ∈ σpre(Sx). Then we choose a permutation σ∗y ∈ σpre(Sy) such that
• ∀j ∈ (Sx ∩ Sy), σ∗x(j) = σ∗y(j),
• ∀j ∈ [N2] \ (Sx ∪ Sy), σ∗x(j) = σ∗y(j),
• ∀j ∈ Sx \ (Sx ∩ Sy),∃i ∈ Sy \ (Sx ∩ Sy) such that σ∗x(j) = σ∗y(i) and σ∗x(i) = σ∗y(j).
Since every permutation corresponding to Sy is in σpre(Sy), there will always be such a σ∗y that
satisfies the above criterion. We choose (σ∗x, σ
∗
y) ∈ R.
For i ∈ [N !(N2 − N)!] let τ n = {τi} be the set of permutations on the elements of [N2] that
do not mix the first N elements with the last N2 − N elements. By σa ◦ σb, we mean apply first
permutation σb, and then permutation σa. Notice that
σpre(Sx) ={τ ◦ σ∗x : τ ∈ τ n}
σpre(Sy) ={τ ◦ σ∗y : τ ∈ τ n}. (51)
Furthermore given τ ∈ τ n, we have
• ∀j ∈ (Sx ∩ Sy), τ ◦ σ∗x(j) = τ ◦ σ∗y(j),
• ∀j ∈ [N2] \ (Sx ∪ Sy), τ ◦ σ∗x(j) = τ ◦ σ∗y(j),
• ∀j ∈ Sx \ (Sx∩Sy),∃i ∈ Sy \ (Sx∩Sy) such that τ ◦σ∗x(j) = τ ◦σ∗y(i) and σ ◦σ∗x(i) = σ ◦σ∗y(j).
For every τ ∈ τ n, we set (τ ◦σ∗x, τ ◦σ∗y) ∈ R. In doing so, we create a one-to-one correspondance
in R between the elements of σpre(Sx) and σpre(Sy). We then repeat this process for all pairs
(Sx, Sy) ∈ SX × SY . The end result is the R that we will use.
Now we need to analyze the properties of this R. Notice that each σx ∈ σX is paired to exactly
one element of σpre(Sy) for each Sy ∈ SY . Thus m = |SY |. Likewise m′ = |SX |.
Now consider (σx, σy) ∈ R. We consider some element j such that σx(j) 6= σy(j). We first
consider the case that j ∈ Sx. We upper bound lx,j, the number of σy′ such that (σx, σy′) ∈ R and
σy′(j) 6= σx(j). To simplify analysis, we use the simple upper bound lx,j ≤ |SY |, which is sufficient
for our purposes. Next we need to upper bound ly,j , the number of σx′ such that (σx′ , σy) ∈ R
and σx′(j) 6= σy(j). By our construction of R, we have j /∈ Sy. Also, by construction, if j /∈ Sy,
σx′(j) 6= σy(j) if and only if j ∈ Sx′ . Since σy is paired to only one element σx for each set Sx, ly,j
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is bounded by the number of sets Sx ∈ SX such that j ∈ Sx. Because SX is α-distributed, at most
a fraction N−α of the sets of SX can contain j, so ly,j ≤ |SX |N−α. In this case we have
lx,jly,j ≤ |SX ||SY |N−α. (52)
We now consider the case that j ∈ Sy. We upper bound ly,j , the number of σx′ such that
(σx′ , σy) ∈ R and σx′(j) 6= σy(j). To simplify analysis, we use the upper bound of ly,j ≤ |SX |,
which is sufficient for our analysis. Next we need to upper bound lx,j, the number of σy′ such that
(σx, σy′) ∈ R and σy′(j) 6= σx(j). By our construction of R, we have j /∈ Sx. Also, by construction,
if j /∈ Sx, σy′(j) 6= σx(j) if and only if j ∈ Sy′ . Since σx is paired to only one element σx for each
set Sx, lx,j is bounded by the number of sets Sy ∈ SY such that j ∈ Sy. Suppose Sfixed contains
keven even elements and kodd odd elements. If j is odd, we have
lx,j =
(
N2/2− kodd − 1
2N/3− kodd − 1
)(
N2/2− keven
N/3− keven
)
≤ 2N/3
N2/2−N/3 |SY |, (53)
while if j is even (in that case, we must have keven < N/3), we have
lx,j =
(
N2/2− kodd
2N/3− kodd
)(
N2/2− keven − 1
N/3 − keven − 1
)
≤ N/3
N2/2−N/3 |SY |, (54)
where we’ve used that
|SY | =
(
N2/2− kodd
2N/3 − kodd
)(
N2/2− keven
N/3 − keven
)
. (55)
Therefore in this case, we have
lx,jly,j = |SX ||SY |O(N−1). (56)
Looking at Eq. (52) and Eq. (56), we see that because α < 1, the bound of Eq. (52) dominates,
and so we have that √
mm′
lx,jly,j
≥
√
|SX ||SY |
|SX ||SY |N−α = N
α/2. (57)
Using the contrapositive of Lemma 2, if an algorithm G makes less than q queries to an oracle
Oσx where σx is promised to be in σX or σY , there exists at least one element of σX and one
element of σY such that the probability of distinguishing between the corresponding oracles less
than is 1/2 + ǫ, where
1
2
√
2N−α/2q > ǫ. (58)
Equivalently, there exists at least one element of σX and one element of σY such that in order for
A to distinguish them with constant bias, one requires Ω(Nα/2) queries.
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